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Tracy Azinge 
Advanced Entertainment Law 
 
 
LET’S GET READY TO RUMBLE! 
Competing Legislation and the Future of Radio and 
Royalties 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Since the inception of sound recording rights under American Copyright law, sound 
recordings have enjoyed limited protection compared to other forms of fixed
1
creative expression.  
The copyright owners of sound recordings, mainly record labels and artists, fight an uphill battle 
for adequate compensation due to limited Copyright protection coupled with explosive 
technological advances in music consumption.   In an attempt to recoup financial losses from 
limited protection and music piracy, copyright owners fight for higher royalty rates for the use of 
their works.
2
 
Conversely, copyright users, such as internet radio or webcasters, fight to lower the 
royalty rates they pay for sound recordings.  Large webcasters, such as Pandora Radio, have 
reportedly paid upwards of 50% of their revenue in royalties.  Webcasters argue the current 
royalty scheme not only threatens their continued existence but also is grossly unfair compared 
to the rates paid by satellite radio broadcasters.
3
  Satellite radio currently pays 6%-8% for 
royalties in sound recording.
4
  Similar to webcasters,   satellite radio is not only opposed to 
legislation that will increase their rates but is actively seeking to reduce the rates they currently 
pay.
5
   
Terrestrial radio broadcasters are in the best position with respect to paying royalties for 
sound recordings.  Due to terrestrial radio’s strong lobbying power, terrestrial radio has enjoyed 
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a statutory exemption from paying royalties since the birthrights of sound recordings in 1971.
6
  
The rationale behind the exemption is terrestrial broadcasters and recording companies have a 
mutually beneficial economic relationship where terrestrial broadcasters helped promote artists’ 
music through airplay, and in turn, increased record sales for artists. 
7
 However, given that the 
technological landscape has drastically changed the business model of the music industry, the 
rationale behind the exemption is arguably applicable to internet and satellite radio who are 
required to pay royalties. 
Consumers play an indirect but important role in the fight over royalties between 
copyright owners and users over royalties.  In creating legislation that will affect the royalties 
paid by webcasters and broadcasters, Congress needs to consider consumer expectations and the 
role they play in proposed solutions for leveling the royalty playing field. Due to the 
technological innovations in music consumption, consumers have enjoyed access to large 
catalogs of musical works at little to no cost.  Both users and owners want the consumer to 
consume their respective products but the main issue is which side should bear the cost or reap 
the majority of the economic benefit.  Does the answer lie in shrinking the owners’ pot of 
royalties to preserve the consumers’ listening experience and the webcasters’ profits, or should 
the pot be expanded by not only increasing the royalty rates of satellite and digital broadcasters, 
but also forcing terrestrial broadcasters to pay higher royalties for internet transmissions of their 
programming? 
8
 
The two key pieces of proposed legislation that address this issue are the Internet Radio 
Fairness Act (IRFA)
9
 and the Interim Fairness in Radio Starts Today (FIRST)
 .10
  Both IRFA and 
FIRST seek to level the economic playing field for internet radio by changing the applicable 
standard used by the Copyright Review Board (CRB) in setting reasonable royalty rates.  IRFA 
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proposes changing from the “willing buyer, willing seller” standard to the 801(b) (1) standard to 
help reduce the disproportional percentage of revenue webcasters pay in royalties.
11
  The 
rationale behind IRFA is lower rates are necessary to ensure the continued growth of internet 
radio.
12
  Conversely, FIRST addresses alleged discriminatory treatment of webcasters by not 
only making terrestrial radio pay higher royalties for their online programming but changing the 
standard to “willing buyer and willing seller” for both satellite and terrestrial AM/FM simulcast 
transmissions.
13
  The rationale behind FIRST is recording artists deserve fair compensation for 
their works, and through fair compensation, creation by artists will be nurtured and encouraged.
14
 
Proponents of both Acts assume that changing the standard used by the CRB will 
magically lead to an increase or decrease in the royalty rates of the various radio platforms.  The 
reality is that there are other factors the CRB must consider in the royalty rate proceeding before 
they apply the 801(b)(1) or the “willing buyer, willing seller” standard such as the market rate 
benchmarks and the rate structure.
15
   In application, the market rate benchmark and the rate 
structure are two fact-specific determinations that have more bearing on the royalty  rate 
determined by the CRB than the 801(b)(1) or “willing buyer, willing seller” standards.  
Essentially, the two seemingly different standards yield the same analysis and considerations by 
the CRB.    While both Acts have positive secondary proposals, their main proposals concerning 
changing the standards are ineffectual.   Furthermore, the main goal of legislation should not be 
increasing the profits of one side over the other in the name of fairness but rather striking the 
right balance of fair compensation, public access, and the promotion of arts and sciences.   
The first section of this paper will address the current copyright regime and discuss the 
§801(b)(1) and the “willing buyer, willing seller” standards.  The second section will examine 
both the positive and negative aspects of IRFA and FIRST.  The third section will discuss 
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recommendations for Congressional action concerning the sound recording royalty structure 
going forward. 
II. COPYRIGHT LANDSCAPE AND THE HOLDER’S RIGHT IN SOUND 
RECORDING 
 
History of Copyright and Sound Recordings 
 Under the Copyright Act, when musical works are created, two separate rights are 
granted.
16
  First, a copyright exists in the underlying music and words, which are granted to the 
songwriter and composer.
17
  The second right that is created is the sound recording which is the 
fixation of the sounds created from the underlying musical work.
18
  Copyright owners’ rights in 
sound recordings were not recognized under the Copyright Act until 1971.
19
  In 1971, Congress 
instituted the first copyright protection for sound recordings by creating the Sound Recording 
Act (SRA).
20
 SRA protected the copyright owner’s exclusive right to reproduction and 
distribution of sound recording.
21
  Congress granted protection under the SRA to provide 
protection against phonorecord piracy due to advanced technology that had the ability to 
replicate sound recordings.
22
  Unfortunately, the SRA failed to provide a performance right in 
sound recordings in effort to protect the interests of terrestrial radio broadcasters.
23
  Congress 
reasoned that the “recording industry and broadcasters existed in a symbiotic relationship where 
the recording industry recognized that radio airplay was free advertising that prompted customers 
to purchase the recordings.”24 When Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976, owners of 
sound recordings were granted the exclusive right to reproduce the work, make derivative works 
and distribute the work.
25
  However, the 1976 Act failed to preserve a performance right for 
sound recordings under §106(4).   
 When the Internet became popular in the 1990’s, the recording industry was once again 
confronted with widespread piracy of its sound recordings due to online transmissions of 
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terrestrial broadcasters and webcasters.
26
  The Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA) lobbied Congress to update the laws for royalties.
27
  In 1995, Congress responded by 
enacting the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording Act (DPRA).
28
  The DPRA gave 
sound recordings a limited public performance right requiring broadcasters of satellite radio to 
pay a royalty for both the musical composition and the sound recording.  It should be noted the 
DPRA did not apply to non-subscription, non-interactive transmissions.
29
  However, as internet 
speeds increased in the years following the passage of DPRA the exclusion of non-subscription 
and non-interactive submissions proved problematic due to the hundreds of radio and webcast 
retransmissions that became available to millions of consumers.
30
  In 1998, Congress passed the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) which added nonsubscription digital audio 
broadcasters to the DPRA’s royalty scheme.31  
 The DPRA and DMCA created a compulsory license system for digital audio 
transmissions.  Under the DMCA,  the webcaster or broadcaster is required to obtain compulsory 
or statutory licenses for the digital performance of musical compositions,
32
 sound recordings
33
 
and ephemeral copies
34
 of sound recordings.  Under the DMCA, the copyright holders and the 
users must attempt to negotiate royalty rates.
35
  In the event the copyright holders and users 
cannot reach consensus CRB (initially the Copyright Arbitration Review Panel for the  first 
Royalty rate set in 2002) is charged with the task of determining a rate.
36
   
 In creating the DMCA, Congress recognized that copyright owners of sound 
recording were particularly vulnerable with respect the internet transmissions of sound 
recordings.
37
  Congress reasoned that the more control and access the consumer has to sound 
recordings online  the greater the possibility for market substitution.
38
  Therefore, the DMCA 
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carved out three classes of music services and afforded each class a separate royalty rate 
standard.  
 Under § 114, the class consists of preexisting subscription services (digital cable 
radio) and preexisting satellite digital audio services (satellite radio) which a user can obtain a 
compulsory license and the applicable royalty rate standard is 801(b)(1).
39
  Under the DMCA, 
preexisting subscription services and preexisting satellite and digital audio services rate setting 
procedure is governed by the 801(b)(1) standard.
40
  Under § 114(f)(1) the cable, satellite and 
subscription royalty rate is governed by the factors listed in section § 801(b)(1) which are: 
1. To maximize availability of creative works to the public. 
2. To afford the copyright owner a fair return for his or her creative work and the copyright user a 
fair income under existing economic conditions 
3. To reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and the copyright user in the product made 
available to the public with respect to relative creative contribution, technological contribution, 
capital investment, cost risk, and contribution to the opening of new markets for creative 
expression and media for their communication. 
4. To minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the industries involved and generally 
prevailing industry practices.
41
 
The 801(b) standard requires the CRB to analyze and consider each objective in 
determining the royalty rate. This standard is a heavier balancing of the copyright owners 
and copyright users interest because this class  poses less of a threat with respect to 
market substitution.
42
  
   The second class of services under § 114(f)  are eligible subscription services 
(subscription, internet radio, digital radio) and new subscription services, which are also 
entitled to compulsory licenses.
43
  This second class of services are not considered 
completely interactive but do pose a threat to the owner’s rights with respect to market 
substitution.  Therefore, the royalty rate proceedings for this second class are governed 
by the “willing buyer willing seller standard.”  Under the “willing buyer, willing seller” 
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model the CRB is charged with determining a royalty rate and may consider the 
following factors: 
1) Whether  the use of the service may substitute for may promote the sales of  
phonorecords or otherwise may interfere with or may enhance the sound recording 
copyright owner’s other streams of revenue from its sound recordings  
2) The relative roles of the copyright owner and the transmitting entity in the 
copyrighted work and service made available to the public with respect to the 
creative contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost and 
risk.
44
 
 
This standard is less rigorous than the 801(b)(1) standard  is driven by the and the CRB is not 
required to even consider the factors in determining a reasonable royalty rate.
45
 
 The last class of services is the interactive services, such as iTunes, which allows 
the consumer access to specified songs at their request.  Interactive services are not able to obtain 
a compulsory license.
 46
  The users are required to negotiate individual licenses with the 
owners.
47
  
The §801(b)(1) Standard and 2006 CRB Rate Setting Proceedings for Satellite Radio 
 Proponents of IRFA and FIRST expect switching the CRB review standard will bring 
parity to the royalty rates paid by satellite radio and internet radio.  Supporters of THE IRFA are 
certain royalty rates paid by webcasters will be reduced by changing the standard from the 
“willing buyer, willing seller” to 801(b)(1).   On the other hand, supporters of FIRST expect that 
switching satellite radio from the 801(b)(1) standard to the “willing buyer willing seller”  will 
increase the rates for satellite radio .  However, both parties are overemphasizing the importance 
of these factors.  In order to assess whether changing the applicable standards will yield the 
result sought by either side it is necessary to analyze how the CRB applies the factors under the 
different standards for setting the royalty rates.  
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CRB’s Determination Concerning Rate Structure 
  The CRB’s first necessary determination was whether satellite radio’s rate 
structure would be calculated as a percentage of revenue or whether satellite radio would pay 
based on a per play model.
48
  Sound Exchange
49
 argued for a per-play rate structure whereas XM 
and Sirius, collectively referred to as preexisting satellite digital audio radio services (SDARS),  
proposed a revenue based structure with an alternative per/play as an alternative proposal.
50
  The 
CRB reasoned that a rate based on revenue was most appropriate because neither party could 
come up with a per-play rate structure that reflected actual usage by the satellite radio listeners.
51
  
Sound Exchange’s expert witness, Dr. Pelcovits stated “the per broadcast/per subscriber metric 
simply does not provide an accurate and dynamic measure of listening and consumption”.52  The 
proponents of the per- play model could not come up with reasons as to why a revenue based 
metric would not work best.
53
  Furthermore, the CRB was concerned that the per play- per 
broadcast model could be abused and manipulated because SDARS could reduce their stations 
while not necessarily reducing their listeners and deprive the copyright owner a fair return for 
their work.
54
 
 The CRB ultimately concluded that the revenue based rate model was the appropriate 
model based on the evidence in the record. The court concluded the revenue based metric would 
be the most accurate proxy for the usage based metric.
55
  The court came to this conclusion in 
light of the lack of evidence demonstrating that there was a ready and calculable performance  
metric that could be used that would accurately reflect the SDARS  usage.
56
    
The Comparable Market Benchmarks 
 The CRB next looked to comparable market place  royalty rates  of services similar to 
satellite radio as “benchmarks” or a starting point for  determining what constituted a reasonable 
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rate.
57
  Both SDARS and Sound Exchange proffered proposals as to comparable market 
benchmarks.
58
  The CRB determined that the 13% was the highest point of the zone of 
reasonableness based on the market benchmarks.
59
    Upon determining a market benchmark, the 
CRB adjusted the rate up or down depending on how the each specific 801(1)(b)(1) policy 
consideration was met.
60
 
The 801(b)(1) Policy Considerations 
Maximizing the Availability of Creative Works to the Public 
 Under this inquiry, the CRB looked at whether an adjustment of the rate was necessary 
based on analyzing the promotion or substitution effect.
61
  The promotion and substitution effect 
addresses the issue of whether the technology involved is increasing or promoting the sound 
recording owner’s sales versus supplanting the owner’s market for their sound recording(s).62   
The SDARS argued that they foster the availability of music by making sure the music is more 
widely disseminated than terrestrial radio, by promoting the artists through airplay.
63
  Therefore, 
SDARS reasoned the rate should be as low as possible to maximize availability of the musical 
product to the public.
64
  SDARS offered no evidentiary support for their contention that there 
was a promotion effect that justified making a downward adjustment or credit in their favor.
65
  
The SDARS only made a conclusory assertion that satellite radio had a promotional effect.
66
 
   On the other hand, Sound Exchange argued that copyright owners, such as record labels 
and artists, would not have an incentive to increase creative output if their compensation is 
compromised.
67
  Sound Exchange reasoned that given the decline of physical CD sales, higher 
royalty rates were necessary to ensure the continued production of music.
68
  SoundExchange 
offered marketing surveys of several consumers conducted by their expert to support the 
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contention that there was a substitution effect that justified the rate staying at the highest point of 
the zone of reasonableness at13%.
69
   
 The judges determined that based on no conclusive qualitative evidence offered by either 
side for either promotion or substitution effect that no other adjustment from the benchmark rate 
was necessary.
70
  The judges determined the evidence produced to demonstrate the impact of the 
claimed substitution or promotion effect was indeterminate.
71
  As a result, the judges did not 
make any adjustments for the first factor of maximizing the availability to the public.
72
 
Fair Return to Copyright Owner and Fair Income to Copyright User 
 The second factor the CRB considered was whether the rate allowed a fair return to the 
copyright owner and fair income to the copyright user.
73
  The CRB determined the ultimate 
question was “whether it is necessary to adjust the result by marketplace evidence” in order to 
achieve this policy objective, and if so, is there sufficient evidence available to do so”.74  
Notably, SDARS argued a fair return for the user was sufficient to generate a competitive return 
on past and future investments.
75
  The CRB determined that the measure of a fair return for the 
copyright user is not dictated by the royalty rate guaranteeing a profit in excess of the user’s fair 
expectation.
76
  In other words, a high rate of return is not indicative of whether a royalty rate 
allows a fair and reasonable return for the user.
77
   
 The CRB further provided that fair income is not one that allows the user to  utilize its 
resources inefficiently.
78
  Rather, a fair income is dictated by whether the market outcome is 
reasonable.  The CRB stated in the absence of substantial evidence of unfair market power in 
setting prices in the benchmark marketplace with respect to the copyright owner, an adjustment 
or credit is in favor of the user is not needed.
79
  In this instance, the SDARS failed to provide 
evidence to demonstrate unfair market power existed in the benchmark market place.
80
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Relative Roles of Copyright Owner and Copyright User in the Product made Available to Public 
with Respective Relative Contributions and Capital Investment 
 Under the third policy objective, the CRB analyzed the relative technological and 
creative contributions of the parties involved.
81
  In addition, they took into account expenditures, 
costs and risks of both the user and the owner.
82
  The SDARS argued that they should receive a 
credit under the third party objective, on the grounds, they made creative contributions to music 
channels and developing and airing non-music programming.
83
  The CRB judges found the 
SDARS creative contribution to music was secondary to copyright owners’ creative contribution.  
The CRB then analyzed the technological contribution and cost, risk, and expenditure of  
SDARS and the record labels to figure out whether an adjustment downward in favor of SDARS 
was warranted.
84
 
 The CRB found that while SDARS made technological contributions, took business risks, 
and made substantial expenditures, record companies also take equally great risks and make 
irreversible investments in talent.
85
  In order to keep incentivizing investment and encourage 
continued investment,  the owner must receive compensation that reflects the value.  The CRB 
found there was very little to distinguish the SDARS contribution from other digital providers 
with the exception of the SDARS expenditure for satellite technology.
86
  The CRB judges did not 
make an adjustment under the third objective.
87
  Thus illustrating the expenditure on behalf of 
the user must distinguish their relative contributions from others within the digital market to 
receive a credit under the third objective. 
Minimizing Any Disruptive Impact on Structure of the Industries Involved and on Generally 
Prevailing Industry Practices 
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 The CRB did in fact allow for a rate adjustment under the fourth factor.
88
  Both 
SoundExchange and SDARS  argued impending doom for their respective industries if the rates 
were either set too high or set too low.
89
  However, the CRB judges determining that an example 
of disruptive impact is if the SDARS was forced to cease operation based on the rates set.
90
 The 
CRB stated there are two circumstances that justify the credit for downward adjustment from the 
upper bound of the zone of reasonableness at 13%.
91
  First, Satellite Radio paid rates between 
2.0% and 2.5%.
92
  Given that Satellite Radio was new and did not have an established customer 
base, the CRB determined that vast jump would have be in danger of having and adverse impact 
on the SDARS.
93
  Second, the CRB was concerned about the constraint on SDARS ability to 
make satellite investments. 
94
 Inability to meet their investment goals during the planned period 
could potentially disrupt the consumer service.
95
  The CRB judges ultimately determined the 
rates as follows:  6.0% for 2007, 6.0% for 2008, 6.5% for 2009, 7.0% for 2010, 7.5% for 2011, 
and 8.0% for 2012.
96
 
The Willing Buyer/ Willing Seller Standard and Rate  and 2005 Negotiations for Webcasters 
 In the 2005 Negotiations between Sound Exchange and Commercial Webcasters, the 
CRB  used the  “willing buyer/ willing seller standard” .97  “The willing buyer, willing seller” 
standard concerns replicating terms that would have been negotiated in a “hypothetical 
marketplace”.98   The rate the CRB determined must reflect rates “that would have been  
negotiated in the market place.”99  Section 114(f)(2)(b) provides “in determining the rates the 
Copyright Royalty Judges shall base their decision on economic, competitive and programming 
information presented by the parties”.100   In analyzing the Willing Buyer/ Willing selling 
standard the CRB Judges can consider the following factors: 
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a) Whether use of the service may substitute for or may promote the sales of phonorecords or 
otherwise may interfere with or may enhance the sound recording copyright’s owner’s 
other streams of revenue sound recordings. 
b) The relative roles of the copyright owner and the transmitting entity in the copyrighted 
work and the service made available to the public with respect to relative creative 
contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost, and risk.
101
 
However, a glaring difference between the factors in the Willing Buyer/ Willing Seller standard 
at the 801(b)(1) standard is that in 801(b)(1) the rate must be analyzed and measured against 
each four objectives to ensure the objectives mentioned are being furthered.  “willing buyer, 
willing seller” standard the factors may considered but they it is not required the CRB take the 
factors into account.  The factors are meant to be used as relevant factors to be considered  by the 
CRB Judges under the willing buyer/ willing seller standard. 
102
 
Rate Structure and Judge’s Determination 
 The CRB judges determined that a per-performance fee structure was more appropriate 
than a revenue based fee structure.
103
  First, the CRB Judges determined the a per performance 
fee structure was most appropriate because per-performance fee structure was a better proxy for 
usage with Internet Radio.
104
  Second, the Judges determined revenue would be difficult to 
determine, particularly when the Digital broadcaster offers other features unrelated to music.
105
  
Additional, the parties could not agree as to what constitute revenue.
106
  Whereas Sound 
Exchange supported a broader definition and scope of revenue, the commercial webcasters 
wanted a restricted scope of revenue.
107
  The Judges concluded “the absence of persuasive 
evidence of what constitutes an unambiguous definition of revenue that properly 
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relates the fee to the value of the rights being provided militates against reliance on a revenue 
based metric.”108  
 In determining the benchmark rate,  the CRB decided the interactive market was the best 
measure of how parties are negotiating on the private market.
109
  The CRB made an adjustment 
for or interactivity that webcasters services lack when accounting for the benchmark rate.
110
  In 
analyzing the “willing buyer, willing seller” factors the court determined that the factors were 
already built into the market rate and no further adjustments were needed.
111
  Due to the fact 
webcasters vary in size, the CRB made a separate rate for smaller webcasters and larger 
webcasters such as Pandora.
112
  The webcasters appealed to Congress claiming the rates were 
excessive and Congress enacted the Webcaster Settlment Act (WSA) of 2008.
113
   Under the 
WSA, SoundExchange and the webcasters were given another opportunity to negotiate the 
royalty rates.
114
  The Pureplay Agreement for 2006-2015 resulted from negotiations under 
WSA.
115
 
III. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION AND FAIRNESS CONCERING SOUND 
RECORDINGS AND RADIO PLATFORMS 
 
The Internet Radio Fairness Act (IRFA) 
 Internet Radio Fairness Act seeks to end discrimination against internet radio in the 
digital marketplace by treating internet Radio the same as satellite and cable radio.  The Act will 
enable new internet radio startups to succeed and create jobs, foster competition, and the 
expansion of the music marketplace in part so the artist can obtain broader exposure and more 
compensation.
116
  Supporters for the bill include Pandora, the consumer Electronics Association 
(members include Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, EBay and Pandora) and the Digital Media 
Association (DiMa).
117
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 The main purpose behind the IRFA is to lower royalty rates for internet radio by 
switching them from a “willing buyer, willing seller” standard to the §801(b)(1) standard the 
CRB uses for satellite and cable radio.   Other aspects of the IRFA include allowing radio 
broadcasters to make digital back-ups (ephemeral copies) already legally obtained, requiring the 
CRB have minimum level of expertise pertaining to their duties and mandate CRB follow 
Federal Rules and the Federal Rules of Evidence, taking steps to establish transparency in the 
royalty rate market and establishing a global music database.
118
 
 The purpose of IRFA is to promote technological growth of digital broadcasting.  Due to 
the higher percentage of revenue paid in royalty rates by webcasters, smaller startup webcaster 
are dissuaded from entering the internet radio market. The intended result of lowering the royalty 
rate is to expand the music marketplace.  The main argument is that expansion of the music 
marketplace through the entry of more webcasters will increase both exposure and compensation 
to the artist.
119
 
 The Consumer Electronics Association (CEA) claims the “irrational and unfair royalty 
system hinders investment and innovation in internet radio.”  The CEA is the preeminent trade 
association promoting growth in the 206 Billion US Consumer electronics industry.
120
 
 Conversely, BTIG
121
 Analyst Richard Greensfeld argues: 
 “On the surface the rates paid by Pandora and other radio services appear in need of 
congressional relief.  However, the reason why companies such as Pandora pay such high royalty 
rates as a percentage of revenues is that they severely limit audio advertising to protect the user 
experience.  If Pandora ran several minutes of audio advertising per hour (the way terrestrial radio 
does) instead of 15 second spots the percentage of revenues paid out as royalties would be 
dramatically lower and comparable to the rates paid by satellite and radio. “ 
  
Greensfeld further provides : 
 
“Pandora is essentially asking the government to intervene and reduce its costs structure to help it 
remain viable business because it knows its business model only works while running limited 
advertising at the expense of the  musicians.” 
122
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Switching to the 801(b)(1) Standard under IRFA 
 Proponents of IRFA expect switching internet radio broadcasting from the Willing 
Buyer/Willing Seller model to the 801(b)(1) standard will bring internet radio rates on parity 
with satellite radio’s rates.  
However, in comparing the CRB’s analysis in both rate determination proceedings, it appears 
that the analysis is similar and the results would be the same for webcasters regardless of what 
standard is applied.  First, both standards merely serve as a basis for adjusting the benchmark 
rate that is set. Therefore, the setting of the benchmark rate has far more bearing on the rate than 
which standard is applied.   
 Secondly, the rate structure, such as whether the rate is determined as a percentage of 
revenue or is based on a per-play model, makes a significant difference.  The reason Pandora and 
other commercial Webcasters pay as much as 50% of revenue is because of the per-play rate 
structure currently in place.  In both rate-setting proceedings, the rate structure determined by the 
CRB is one that appropriately captures actual usage.   The CRB judges justified the per-
performance usage fee structure by stating the ‘per-performance structure was the directly tied to 
the nature of the right being licensed, as opposed to revenue”.123   A percentage of revenue 
would be difficult to calculate because it would be difficult to identify relevant webcaster 
revenue when the webcaster offers other features that are not related to music which  causes 
ambiguity in what constitutes revenue for webcasters.
124
  Unless, webcasters and copyright 
owners are able to agree on what constitutes revenue, how to calculate it and a way to capture 
usage in revenue than the CRB is likely to maintain a per-performance fee structure for 
webcasters. 
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 Lastly, similar considerations are made under the “willing buyer, willing seller” standard 
in the rate determination.  If Congress were to change the standard for Webcasters,  the CRB’s 
reasoning in the  rate proceeding for satellite radio suggest the royalty rate would not change.   In 
the Satellite rate setting proceeding, the first factor, which seeks to ensure the availability of 
creative works to the public is maximized, the CRB focused heavily on substitution effect and 
promotional effect based on the evidence, or lack thereof, by the parties.
125
  The CRB deferred to 
the interactive benchmark market and stated the substitution/promotion effect was already 
accounted for.
126
  Similar in the satellite radio rate setting preceding the judges factored in the 
substitution and promotion effect and similarly deferred to the benchmark market.
127
   
 The second factor under 801(b)(1) considers the fair return of users and owners, is not 
explicitly mentioned in “willing buyer, willing seller” factors.   Since the basis of the “willing 
buyer/ willing seller” standard replicates a hypothetical market where the rate is based on what 
the seller would be willing to sell, a fair rate of return to the user is built into the standard.  
IRFA’s proponents claim the royalty system badly discriminates against internet radio and 
hinders investment and innovation in internet radio.
128
  Tim Wistergreen, founder and CEO of 
Pandora, claims in an advertisement played on Pandora that royalty rates at 50% hinders them 
from seeing a fair rate of return.
129
  The CRB state with respect to this objective  and fair income 
to the user, “ A fair income is not the same thing as guaranteeing them a profit in excess of fair 
expectations of a highly leveraged enterprise.
130
  A fair income is also not one which allows the 
SDARS to utilize its other resources inefficiently”.131  Therefore, not generating excessive profits 
is not automatically indicative of a return that is not fair to the user, especially when the user has 
other efficient options.  Webcasters have options such as charging a subscription or sell more 
advertising.  Furthermore, internet radio would need to provide substantial evidence to show the 
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exercise of unfair market power by copyright owners in setting of prices in the benchmark 
marketplace which is the interactive webcasting market 
 In measuring internet radio against the third factor of the relative roles of the contribution 
of the copyright user and the copyright owner the  CRB look at the contributions both creative 
and technological.
132
  In the SDARS proceeding, SDARS argued they were entitled to a credit 
under the third objective because of the enhancement they made in their music channels and their 
non-music programming.
133
  The CRB notes “While SDARS’ creative contributions to music 
channels may be relevant, it is certainly subsidiary to and dependent on the creative contributions 
of the record companies and artists to the making of the sound recordings that are the primary 
focus of those music channels.”134  In other words, the creative contributions of SDARS are 
secondary to the creative contributions of the owner because SDARS music programming is 
entirely dependent on the creative output of the owners. 
  The CRB further notes on to state that with respect to the technical contributions, capital 
investment, cost, risk, and the opening of new markets both SDARS and the record labels make 
substantial contributions.
135
   As a result, the CRB judges determined that a credit was not 
warranted under this objective.
136
  However, the CRB judges note that the primary expenditure 
that distinguishes satellite radio from other digital distributors is their investment in satellite 
technology.
137
   Webcasters do not incur the same costs, and expenditures and risk as satellite 
radio.  In addition, webcasters such as Pandora, offer only music to its customers which the CRB 
notes is secondary, which relegates webcasters creative contributions as secondary to the 
Copyright owners. 
 The fourth factor that did end up securing a credit in favor of Satellite radio was 
minimizing any disruptive impact on the industries involved and on generally prevailing industry 
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practices.
138
  At the time the SDARS proceeding Satellite was a relatively new service and paid 
2.0%-2.5%.
139
  The CRB judges determined that charging Satellite Radio the upper bound of 
zone of reasonableness (13%) and cause a disruptive impact.
140
  The CRB notes that at the time 
SDARS had not yet obtained a sufficient fan base.
141
  The CRB was concerned that satellite 
radio would be inhibited from making satellite investments.  Webcasters, like Pandora, are not 
new and have an established listener base.  In addition, webcasters have paid the royalty rates 
and are still able sustainable business enterprises in spite of the reportedly high rates.  The CRB  
would most likely not grant a credit to adjust the rate if Internet Radio was being under the fourth 
objective. 
IRFA’s Additional Proposals 
 IRFA proposes allowing radio broadcasters to make digital back-ups (ephemeral copies) 
already legally obtained.
142
  Under the current regime, digital backups of music legally 
purchased is generally illegal.  As such,  Webcasters are vulnerable to litigation from record 
labels for backing up copies to their servers.  IRFA proposes granting Webcasters the right to 
back up legally obtained ephemeral copies provided the back ups are used only to facilitate 
webcasting. 
 Additionally,  IRFA would require CRB judges have minimum level of expertise 
pertaining to their duties,  mandate CRB follow Federal Rules and Federal Rules of Evidence, 
and that the judges be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
143
  Additionally, 
IRFA would take steps to “shine a light” on the types of royalty rates are negotiated between 
private parties in private contracts.
144
  It is difficult for the CRB judges to try to determine rates 
figure out comparable benchmark markets in the absence of knowing what real negotiated rates 
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are.  As it stands now the market is “opaque and transparency is needed order for the CRB 
judges to effectively set reasonable rates for both Satellite and Internet radio platforms.
145
   
 Lastly, in order to help facilitate artists and Copyright owners in combating copyright 
infringement, IRFA proposes the creation of a global music rights database.
146
  The database will 
include information related to musical works, the owners, authorized licensors and the author of 
the work.
147
  The expectation with the database is that copyright information will be readily 
available and the owners can hold broadcasters and users accountable for their compensation.
148
  
In terms of compensation it is unclear where this fits into the Internet Radio royalty discussion 
however considering how complicated to pin down information concerning Copyright rights 
holders
149
 this innovation would provide a great benefit to owners and user’s alike.  This 
proposal for a global registry is definitely a policy Congress should look into whether the main 
provision of  IRFA passes or fails. 
Interim Fairness in Radio Starts Today (FIRST) 
 In contrast to IRFA, FIRST seeks to increase royalty rates by applying the same market-
based royalty standard that Webcasters pay to the rates Satellite Radio pays.  The rationale 
behind the introduction of this bill is that artists should be properly compensated for their works 
to nurture and encourage investment and innovation in the recording industry.   Some important 
findings that serve as a catalyst for the bill include: 
1) Supporting recording artists and copyright owners, as well as the creativity they inspire, is 
vital to the economic and cultural future of the United States. 
2) Sound recordings are the only works capable of being performed that do not have a full 
performance right in the United States. 
3) All other Organization for Economic Co-operation and development (OECD) countries 
besides the United States provide a performance right in sound recordings. 
4) Even the largest radio broadcaster in the United States has now recognized that recording 
artists and their investors deserve compensation for the public performance of the their 
intellectual property. 
5) Just as all radio platforms should compensate creators and copyright owners for the use of 
their music, all radio platforms should pay compensation based the same royalty standard, 
regardless of the technology or business model they employ.
150
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 The first major component of FIRST involves applying the “willing buyer, willing seller” 
model to satellite radio in order to properly compensate creators.   The CRB engage in similar 
analysis concerning the two standards.  Whereas it appears the 801(b)(1) standard attempts to 
strike a better balance, the hearings demonstrate that the CRB deferred heavily to the benchmark 
market rates in the absence of substantial evidence offered to make upward or downward 
adjustments .  For instance, in the satellite rate proceeding, the CRB deferred to the benchmark 
market rates for the first and second factor.
151
  However, the one major difference between the 
two standards is that CRB goes through each objective to ensure that the market rate satisfies the 
objective.
152
  Under the “willing buyer/willing seller” model the judges weigh the two factors 
broadly.
153
  Therefore, even though the analysis is similar for the two standards, the inquiry 
under the 801(b)(1) standard is more extensive. 
 There are key differences between satellite radio and internet radio that warrants different 
treatment under the two standards.  First, Satellite consumers do not have the ability to control 
their listening experience to the extent that the music can be skipped or cued as a favorite  with 
internet radio.  While webcasting is not considered an interactive service, internet radio allows 
the user to have a lot more control over their listening experience by allowing the user to skip 
songs and pick favorite artists and songs.  Therefore, the potential or threat of market substitution 
is greater with webcasters and as a result the “willing buyer, willing seller” standard is most 
appropriate.  Since the threat is not as likely with satellite radio because the listener has no 
control over the music order or flow, the “willing buyer, willing seller” standard is not 
appropriate for satellite radio.   
 Secondly, Satellite Radio offers non-music programming in addition to stations that are 
exclusively music and make greater technical contributions to the musical landscape.  With 
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respect to internet radio, sound recordings are their sole and exclusive product and is inexpensive 
to start up.  Since satellite radio makes greater  investments, such as satellite equipment, and has 
varied programming substantial analysis provided by the 801(b)(1) standard is necessary. 
 The second component of FIRST includes charging AM/FM simulcastors of terrestrial 
radio higher rates to account for the fact that terrestrial radio has enjoyed the benefits of not 
paying for the use of sound recordings.
154
  Supporters include Sound Exchange, the RIAA. 
American Federation of Musicians and the musicFIRST Coalition.
 155
   Under the American 
Copyright Act, terrestrial radio has long  enjoyed an exemption based on the belief that record 
labels and artists have a symbiotic relationship with terrestrial broadcasters and enjoy a 
promotional benefit from the broadcasters.
156
  However, given that the terrestrial radio has a seen 
a decrease in its listening audience, that belief is now a myth that no longer offers a workable 
explanation as to why terrestrial radio does not pay royalties for over the air transmissions for 
sound recordings.  While  this is an innovative feature of FIRST that indirectly gets at artist 
compensation from terrestrial radio, it does not go as far as to remove the exemption enjoyed by 
terrestrial radio broadcasters.  The rationale behind the exemption under the statute is no longer 
reasonable given the landscape of technology and availability radio listening options.  While 
AM/FM terrestrial radio has also lost listenership as a result of the technological boom and radio 
listening alternatives, there is no reason why they should still not pay royalties for the use of 
sound recordings.  While they may not be in a position to pay higher royalty rate, fairness 
dictates the copyright owner receive compensation for terrestrial radio’s use of sound recordings.   
 FIRST notes in its findings that the United States is the only OECD country that does not 
recognize a right in sound recording.
157
  As a result, foreign broadcasters in other countries that 
play American music pay royalties to foreign societies that do not disburse the royalties due to 
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lack of reciprocity.
158
  American artists, and right holders have uncollected royalties as a result of 
not only the terrestrial broadcast exemption but also the lack of recognized right in sound 
recordings. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Changing Standards for Internet Radio is Inconsequential Therefore a Change 
is Not Necessary 
 Both Acts wish treat satellite radio and internet radio  similarly ,however, maintaining the 
current standard for internet and satellite radio is in fact warranted.  As aforementioned, the 
belief all radio platforms should pay compensation based on the same royalty standard, 
regardless of the technology or the business model they employ is not logical considering the 
technologies involved are drastically different.  Broadcast and satellite radio have certain 
limitations that are not the same in the webcast context with regard to interactivity.  Both 
terrestrial and satellite radio have advertising and shows in addition to music played.  On the 
other hand, webcasters have only one product, being music, which justifies have the  pay per 
play rate structure as opposed to a percentage of their revenue.  Furthermore, the culprit that 
lends to higher rates for webcasters is the royalty rate structure and the chosen comparable 
market place benchmarks.  Whether the standard is the 801(b) (1) standard or the “willing buyer, 
willing seller”, the standard only serves s an adjuster from the benchmark rate. 
  Additionally, The digital performance licenses are statutory or compulsory licenses 
which is an intrusion on the owners’ exclusive rights under the Copyright Act. Given 
compulsory licenses strips the owner of the right to bargain for the value of the sound recording 
in the market place, the owner should have the upper hand in negotiating royalty rates for the 
licenses.  The equities do not lie in “cutting internet radio a break” for the sake of allowing them 
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to make higher profits.  If webcasters were not entitled to a compulsory license, they would have 
less bargaining power in negotiations because without the sound recordings there is no internet 
radio.  
The Terrestrial Radio Exemption Should be Removed  
 Based on FIRST’s language, it is unclear whether the proposal is to remove the 
exemption from the statute, or have commercial broadcasters who have an AM/FM simulcast 
pay a higher royalty to account for the terrestrial broadcaster’s exemption. Congress needs to 
remove the exemption from terrestrial radio completely.  The rationale concerning the exemption 
and the mutually beneficial relationship that broadcasters and right holders’ is no longer reality.  
The same rationale could be used to justify an exemption for both satellite and internet radio.   
 Rights holders suffer a loss of compensation for the royalties of sound recording played 
over American radio.  The United State is the only industrialized nation that does not recognize a 
performance right over terrestrial radio.
159
  As a result, royalties are collected for American 
music played on international radio stations but American artists/ rights holders cannot collect 
the United States does not recognize a performance right over terrestrial radio.
160
 
Work Collaboratively Together Reach a Settlement Agreement without the CRB 
   It is in the best interest for the users and owners to work together, as demonstrated by 
the Webcaster’s Settlement Agreement of 2002.161   Broadcasters should support fair 
compensation for the rights holders.  Conversely the rights holders should not push for rates that 
are unreasonable and cripple digital advancements in music platforms.  The Vice President of the 
RIAA acknowledges that digital downloads in 2011 totaled $2.6 billion, up from the prior year.  
Additionally, “Digital albums showed particularly strong gains, up to 25% by value to 1.1 billion 
and digital individual track sales grew to 1.5 billion, and 1.3 billion copies.  Music subscription 
 25 
 
grew to a new height in 2011 o f $241 million.”162  Radio platforms, particularly satellite radio, 
webcasters, and simulcast broadcasters, and rights holders have a symbiotic relationship and 
growth of the user and the holder depend on continued successful relationships between the two 
parties.  Both parties are in a better position than the legislature or the judiciary to negotiate rates 
that are manageable for both parties.  As demonstrated in the Settlement Act of 2002 and the 
Webcasters Settlements Agreements, the parties in interest are in a better position to determine 
what the rates should be. 
Webcasters Should Share Costs  
With Consumers to Reduce Their Royalty Costs 
  Instead of expecting the copyright holders, more specifically artists, to subsidize 
the cost of royalties for webcasters, consumers need to pay their fair share.  Prior to the 
technological advances of the internet, rights holders had exclusive control over their works.  
Most consumers, with the exception of bootleggers, had to buy the physical embodiment of the 
work.  The ease of access and quality of sound recording transmissions does not mean that the 
corresponding cost and time expenditure in its creation has decreased.  Rights holders are 
entitled to profit from their works and the answer is not to subsidize the cost for consumers at the 
expense of compensation of the right’s holders  in an attempt to give the consumer the world of 
music at little to no cost.   
If webcasters’ rates were reduced to similar rates paid by satellite radio that would only 
create a race to the bottom.  Arguably, lowering rates to make it easier for smaller webcasters to 
break into the business will not necessarily yield more innovation but rather replication of what 
is already technologically available.  However, if webcasters charged subscriptions, more 
innovation would result because in order to be sustainable, the consumer would have to be 
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persuaded the service was worth the expenditure.  Furthermore, a modest subscription will 
generate more revenue for the webcaster to help shoulder the cost of royalties 
Transparency of the Royalty Rate Markets by Users and Owners 
 Both sound recording owners and radio platforms  make conclusory assertions concerning 
the future of their industries without any concrete evidence, as demonstrated in the rate setting 
proceedings.  Both owners and users claim rates set either too high or too low will stifle the 
future of their industries.   Neither side produced evidence concerning the royalties they pay or 
receive.  In both proceedings, both SoundExchange and the Broadcasters brought in economist 
and professors to make general assertions that the CRB is forced to make a determination on, in 
the absence of concrete figures.  The music industry refuses to discuss how much artists are paid 
or how much record companies make after the royalty checks are paid.  Conversely, webcasters 
discuss their plight in broad percentages and numbers.   Greater transparency is  
needed to help the CRB make a well-reasoned rate determination that are fair to both sides. 
CONCLUSION 
 Overall, Congressional action that changes the standard is not the going adequately 
address disproportionately high rates paid by webcasters.  The standard rather is inconsequential 
as applied to Webcasters because the analysis under the standards is relatively similar.  Based on 
the rate proceedings the most important determinations were the rate structure and the 
benchmark market rate. Once the rate structure and the bench market rate are determined, the 
factors within the standards serve as grounds for merely adjusting the rate up or down.   
  Given the licenses are compulsory, the answer does not lie in reducing the compensation 
of the owners whose hands are already tied with respect to the licenses.  Rather the solution lies 
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in encouraging users such as Pandora to run their businesses with more efficiency by increasing 
advertising or making consumers pay a modest subscription. 
 Both copyright owners and users need to work together for the same desirable result 
which is mass consumption of their respective goods.  If royalty rates are set too high, there is a 
potential danger the availability of internet radio platforms will be negatively impacted.  
However, if the rates are set too low, investment in music could decline drastically and reduce 
the creative output of artists and record companies.  Either way, the constitution seeks to ensure 
continued growth of  technological innovations such as music platforms and the continued 
creative output and investment by artists and record companies for the sake of the public at large.  
Royalty rates that threaten extinction of either industry will only be detrimental to the public and 
violate the principles set forth under the Constitution 
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